Criticism of the Energiewende fuels AfD. East German elections could shake up German energy policy

State elections will be held in two eastern German states in September, and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is leading in polls in both. Energy policy is one of the most visible campaign issues. High electricity prices, fears of industrial decline, the future of coal, Russian gas and the overall rationale of the Energiewende are all being debated. And even if the AfD remains outside government, commentators say a strong result could give it significant influence over the future direction of the debate on German energy policy.  

Energy policy has once again become a major election issue in Europe and around the world in recent years, and Germany is no exception. Electricity prices in the country remain high even years after the shift away from Russian gas and the closure of its last nuclear power plants. Moreover, the country has been pursuing an energy transition for a long time, with its costs weighing heavily on energy-intensive industry. And it is precisely in the areas where the most energy is consumed that fears are growing that manufacturing, and with it jobs, will move elsewhere. Perhaps the most visible example of this trend is the situation surrounding carmaker Volkswagen.

Germany now faces two elections that will show how current developments are affecting public sentiment. Both states holding the elections also have their own distinct energy story, making energy policy a particularly “popular” issue for politicians and voters alike. Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania is where the Nord Stream pipelines come ashore, a symbol of the former dependence on Russian gas that the AfD openly advocates restarting. In eastern German lignite regions such as Lusatia, meanwhile, the issue is the end of coal mining—with the legal deadline set no later than 2038—and the so-called just transition. The question of future jobs and the transformation of the local economy strongly resonates throughout the region.

Regional issues are also compounded by another uncertainty that features in national-level debates. Following the move away from nuclear power, the government has bet on building new gas-fired power plants that are meant to switch to green hydrogen later. However, some experts consider this transition technically and economically uncertain. Politicians therefore have plenty of energy issues to turn to during the election campaign.

Back to nuclear, coal and Russian gas

It is precisely in this situation that the AfD enters with an appealingly simple recipe: return to coal, nuclear power and Russian gas. According to a Reuters overview, the party wants to retain and expand coal-fired power plants, including domestic lignite mining; reverse the nuclear phase-out; end support for wind and solar power; leave the Paris climate agreement; reduce energy taxes; restart the Nord Stream pipelines; and lift sanctions on Russian gas and oil. Put simply, it wants to return to what Germany’s energy sector looked like ten years ago.

The AfD emphasises these plans very strongly in its campaign, and voters are clearly receptive to its narrative. Party representatives have also long fuelled scepticism in public debate about the current direction of the country’s energy sector and industry, portraying the entire energy transition as “deindustrialisation by design”. Judging by the party’s electoral support, a substantial share of citizens agree with this narrative—not only in the east, where the AfD is consistently strong, but also in the west of the country, where the party had previously lacked a particularly strong presence.

This was already evident in the March election in wealthy Baden-Württemberg in southern Germany, where the party won 18.8 percent and its support almost doubled compared with the previous result. According to local commentators, the party was helped by the aforementioned “anti-Energiewende” narrative. In the east, where the party consistently polls at around thirty percent or more, this rhetoric finds even more fertile ground. The urgency of this agenda for the entire country was further reinforced by this year’s conflict in the Middle East, which raised energy prices and revived the AfD’s long-standing demand for Germany to return to cheap Russian gas.

The rest of the political spectrum is heading in the opposite direction, with the individual parties sharing far more common ground in their platforms. Despite their partial differences, the current governing coalition agrees that the most reliable route to cheaper electricity is to build more wind and solar capacity and gradually replace natural gas with hydrogen. Although the conservative CDU/CSU takes a more cautious tone, as it wants to consider a return to nuclear power and avoid closing coal-fired plants before replacements are available, these parties have one thing entirely in common, setting them fundamentally apart from the AfD: they do not want to return to Russian gas.

The party can influence energy policy even without governing

According to repeated statements by their representatives, none of the governing parties intends to cooperate with the AfD. And this is where political commentators see the greatest uncertainty at present. Even if the AfD remains in opposition, a strong result would give it real influence not only over public debate but also over the functioning of institutions. If it wins around a third of the seats in a state parliament, it holds what is known as a blocking minority.

According to Reuters, this would give it enough votes to block decisions requiring a two-thirds majority, such as amendments to a state constitution or the appointment of judges and senior security officials. And if it were exceptionally to enter a state government, it could also complicate some Germany-wide legislation through the Bundesrat, where representatives of the individual state governments sit.

However, experts say indirect pressure is more important. Political scientist Janine Patz of Jena’s Institute for Research on Social Cohesion warned Clean Energy Wire that if established parties begin adopting AfD slogans on energy prices, nuclear power or the pace of the transition for short-term gains, they could undermine both their own climate policy and the country’s competitiveness in the longer term. In other words, the AfD does not need to win an election to shift the entire debate in the direction it has long promoted.

The September elections are therefore unlikely to hand the AfD power over Germany-wide energy policy, and commentators say the party does not yet have the strength to push through a return to the “old” energy system. Nevertheless, energy has become one of the main fault lines in contemporary German politics, and the result may indicate how quickly—or, conversely, how slowly—Germany, and with it Central Europe as a whole, may advance in the energy transition in the coming years.