How long will German nuclear reactors continue operating?

One of the main reasons for the current energy crisis in the European Union is Germany’s Energiewende. It created an extreme dependence on Russian gas in Germany. Despite the dramatic impact that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had on European energy due to this dependence, Germany’s Green Party industry minister insisted for a very long time on shutting down the remaining three nuclear units at the end of 2022. Only recently has the depth of the crisis forced him to change this decision.

The German government has only now conceded that the last three operating German nuclear reactors could remain in service at least until April 2023 to help overcome the most challenging winter period. German Minister for Industry, Energy and Climate Robert Habeck insisted for a very long time that the nuclear units had to be shut down as planned at the end of the year. He argued that they could not help with anything, and the only concession he was willing to make was for them to remain on standby after shutdown in case of a crisis. He presented these views even when ministry experts confirmed that extended operation would make a very significant contribution to the stability of the power system, especially in industrial Bavaria in the south. The reactors would also help reduce gas consumption and thus lower both gas and electricity prices. Before looking in more detail at the current situation, let us recall the history of German nuclear power.

History of nuclear power in Germany

As in France, an energy strategy based on the use of nuclear energy gained traction in Germany in the 1970s. It was a response to the 1973 oil crisis. This was triggered by the war between Arab states and Israel. The subsequent embargo on oil exports by Arab states to countries supporting Israel, the reduction in oil production by OPEC countries and other accompanying economic effects caused a dramatic increase in energy commodity prices and an energy and economic crisis.

The response to these events in a number of advanced countries was an effort to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. One option was nuclear power, which was just beginning to develop. At that time, the transition from first-generation to second-generation reactors was under way, and the capacity of reactors being built was also gradually increasing. The technology had thus reached a sufficiently advanced level that in principle allowed large-scale deployment.

France and Germany were at the forefront of technological and industrial development, including in nuclear technology research. The two countries worked very closely together in developing nuclear research and industry. Above all, their two companies Framatom and Siemens reached a world-leading level in this field. These companies succeeded in developing ever better reactors with ever higher capacity. The capacity of the most modern ones approached 1.5 GWe. In addition to state-of-the-art Generation II reactors, leading research into advanced nuclear technologies was carried out in both Germany and France. Examples include the Phénix and Superphénix sodium-cooled fast reactors in France and high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactors in Germany.

Unfortunately, developments in France and Germany began to diverge in the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s. Green anti-nuclear activists slowed the development of nuclear power in both countries. In France, they succeeded in halting the development of sodium-cooled fast reactors, but France ultimately built a nuclear sector capable of supplying more than 70 % of its electricity. In Germany, however, developments led to a complete exit from nuclear power and research in this field. Germany therefore cancelled the joint development of Generation III reactors being prepared by Framatom and Siemens. The Generation III EPR reactor thus became a purely French project. Even so, at its peak Germany obtained up to a third of its electricity from nuclear units, and they were a crucial source of power particularly in industrial Bavaria. Let us look at how Germany arrived at the Energiewende.

History of Germany’s Energiewende

Green anti-nuclear activist movements gained very strong influence in Germany in the 1980s. It should be recalled that the original Greenpeace was predominantly an anti-nuclear weapons movement, and based on the notion that nuclear weapons are essentially the same as nuclear power, green movements embraced an extremely anti-nuclear ideology. As Dana Drábová says, it is exactly like the saying that watches are the same as Wellington boots because both are wound up. Green anti-nuclear activists do not distinguish between a nuclear bomb and a nuclear power plant. And it was precisely in Germany, partly because of its history, that a very strong anti-war and anti-nuclear weapons movement turned into a very strong anti-nuclear power movement. Anti-nuclear activists were highly adept at exploiting various legal loopholes in connection with construction proceedings, and were thus able to achieve the shutdown of the already completed Mülheim-Kärlich nuclear power plant after less than two years of operation between 1986 and 1988. They ultimately prevented the restart of this 1,300 MWe boiling-water reactor permanently.

In 1998, when a coalition of the Greens and the SPD came to power, the nuclear phase-out became official policy and the path towards the Energiewende began. Its main priority was the shutdown of nuclear power plants, with emissions reduction only secondary. A scenario was gradually established, and at the beginning of this century the coalition set a deadline to close all nuclear units by 2022. As 2010 approached, it gradually became clear that the potential replacement of nuclear reactors with other sources and the construction of the necessary transmission lines from north to south were not progressing as quickly as expected. At the same time, a coalition led by the CDU/CSU came to power. It did not cancel the nuclear phase-out, but postponed the complete closure of nuclear units by roughly ten years. An agreement was negotiated between the government and nuclear plant operators that, in exchange for the possibility of extending operations, they would pay a special tax.

In 2011, an earthquake and tsunami in Japan led to the accident at the Fukushima I nuclear power plant. Germany was preparing for elections at the time. Chancellor Angela Merkel realised that this issue was becoming decisive and could cause her defeat and secure victory for the Greens. She therefore decided on an immediate return to the original nuclear phase-out scenario.

To replace the nuclear units being shut down, it was necessary to build as much renewable capacity as possible, mainly wind and solar. However, this is not enough, and other sources are needed for periods when there is no wind or sunshine. Therefore, substantial new fossil-fuel capacity was also built, predominantly gas-fired but also coal-fired. The most suitable conditions for wind farms are on the coast in northern Germany. Construction of high-voltage transmission lines from north to south is therefore also crucial. This replacement capacity was built before nuclear and older coal-fired sources began to be shut down. In the second half of the 2010s, this resulted in excess capacity in the European Union, which caused low electricity prices, especially when there was strong wind or sunshine. This also created a situation in other countries, particularly Germany’s neighbours, in which no new energy sources were economically viable without subsidies, and the shutdown of some existing ones accelerated.

Since Germany expected that after shutting down nuclear units it would also replace coal-fired plants with gas-fired ones in the future, it was clear that it needed to secure large volumes of the cheapest possible gas. This was the reason for the construction of the Nord Stream I and II gas pipelines and the creation of Germany’s extreme dependence, and to a considerable extent that of the entire European Union, on gas from Russia.

How could the situation with German nuclear reactors develop?

Let us look at the options available to Germany for using its nuclear reactors. The first option is to stick to the original Energiewende timetable and shut down the reactors at the end of this year. Equivalent to this is Minister Habeck’s proposal to shut down the units and keep them only as a reserve for crisis situations. During operation, modern reactors can vary their output over a relatively wide range and contribute very effectively to grid balancing. However, they are not designed for an operating mode in which they are shut down and started up only in the event of unexpected events. This is not a suitable regime from technological, safety or economic perspectives.

The second option is to extend the operation of two or even all three of the last remaining operating reactors through the critical winter period. The two reactors in southern Germany are essential for grid stability in these industrial regions. The third is in the north and is not as important. To extend operations by several months, fuel already in the reactor core can be used. Efficient use of this fuel (burn-up) and adapting operations to conditions would make it possible to best support electricity grid stability and save gas that would otherwise be burned in gas-fired power plants. This is precisely the option that Germany’s political leadership ultimately agreed to recently, announcing an extension of operations until mid-April. The fact that the Greens in the governing coalition also accepted it is very important, because this option is conditional on changing the laws that require reactor shutdown by 2022, as well as meeting the nuclear regulator’s conditions for continued operation.

The third option is to extend the operation of three or even six reactors for a longer period, not merely years but rather decades. An extension for a short period of a few years makes no sense, not only from an economic perspective. Fuel production must be resumed. The advantage is that Germany has a plant producing nuclear fuel that is capable of supplying fuel assemblies for German reactors. However, restarting its production would take more than a year. At the same time, maintenance for longer-term operation and all the necessary documentation for the nuclear safety authority must be completed. All of this requires an effort that pays off only with sufficiently long operation of the nuclear units. The six reactors, three of which are still operating and three of which were shut down at the end of last year, are modern and meet very good safety and technological standards. They are around thirty years old and can safely and reliably supply electricity for at least another twenty years. Naturally, it would be best for Germany and the entire European Union if these reactors operated for the aforementioned two decades. Better still would be if Germany ultimately returned to nuclear power. Unfortunately, it is difficult to expect Germany’s political elite to engage in self-reflection, admit its mistake and seek to correct it.

Problems with French nuclear reactors this year

This year, European energy has been heavily affected by problems with France’s nuclear fleet. Let us examine their causes. Fuel changes and other planned nuclear unit outages are generally scheduled for the summer, when consumption in France is at its lowest. There is a very large difference between winter and summer consumption in France. This is also due to the widespread use of electricity for heating. Unlike Germany or Czechia, France therefore has low emissions and fossil fuel consumption in the heating sector as well.

Over the past two years, planned inspections, maintenance and fuel changes were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic in order to limit access by external workers and the likelihood of the disease spreading at the plants. Outages were therefore concentrated in this summer. Then, unexpectedly, stress corrosion and microscopic cracks were discovered near welds on safety injection system piping at some reactors. These were newer reactor types, and all units of the same type need to be inspected. It is necessary to determine the origin of the cracks and whether they are developing or remain unchanged, with their discovery made possible by improvements in non-destructive weld analysis methods. At the end of July, the French nuclear regulator approved EDF’s analysis results and plan for addressing the problem. The company thus promised that it could restart most of the shut-down units by the turn of the year. However, actual schedules may be heavily affected by strikes that have taken place in France, including at nuclear power plants. It is therefore still uncertain to what extent French nuclear power will be able to contribute to resolving the critical situation in European energy this winter.

It should be noted that a number of problems in French nuclear power were caused by strong pressure from anti-nuclear activists and uncertainty over the future energy strategy. This led to announcements that the share of nuclear sources in electricity generation would be reduced to 50 %, and that nuclear units would not operate beyond 40 years. This naturally did not encourage the operator to make the greatest possible effort to ensure long-term operation.

Last winter already dramatically changed the attitude of French society and political leaders towards energy. France is now returning to intensive use of nuclear energy and is planning the construction of new units. Problems may arise in getting through this winter, but the certainty of long-term use of existing units and support for constructing new ones should bring stability and confidence. Work is currently under way on the possibility of simplifying the approval process for building new units at sites adjacent to existing nuclear power plants. The first two new units could be built at the existing Penly plant.

As already mentioned, such high output is not needed in summer. Therefore, it need not be a problem if issues related to high temperatures and water shortages in rivers increase. Alternatively, the situation could be resolved by building cooling towers, which French power plants have mostly lacked so far. It is thus very likely that France’s highly successful low-emission energy mix will continue. Comparing energy developments in France and Germany will be very interesting.

Conclusion

Due to the extreme ideologisation of energy policy, in which green ideology was prioritised over respect for physical and technological reality, the European Union has found itself in enormous difficulties that threaten its social, economic and political integrity. One of the main culprits is Germany and its Energiewende. Due to Germany’s great economic weight, its problems have spread to its neighbours. So far, however, there unfortunately appears to have been no self-reflection at the European Union level, or even in Germany.

In practical terms, the current crisis in European energy and its dependence on fossil-fuel sources must be addressed in both the short and long term. It is essential to respect the key condition that domestic coal-fired sources must not be shut down before low-emission replacements have been built. These must ensure not only an overall replacement of generation but electricity supplies at every time of day and in every season. In the short term, the full potential of existing sources, balancing capabilities and savings must be used. Nuclear units that can safely and reliably supply electricity for many more years and decades should therefore not be shut down.

In the long-term perspective, an efficient and reliable low-emission mix based on a combination of nuclear and renewable sources must be built. For the European Union, this means restoring its capabilities in nuclear technologies. It is very important for Czechia to participate in this effort.

Finally, I would like to share one personal opinion. I am not a political scientist, and this is a hypothesis in the realm of “what if ...”, so take it with a grain of salt. My personal view is that if Germany had not pursued the Energiewende under the influence of green ideology and had not become totally dependent on Russian gas, Putin would not have dared to invade Ukraine at the end of February 2022. He counted on Ukraine being unable to resist for long and on Germany, because of its extremely high energy dependence on him, ensuring that the European Union’s response to the invasion would be weak. Our publication on small modular reactors (in Czech) was recently released as part of the Czech Academy of Sciences’ popular brochure series, along with the popular book entitled “Nuclear Physics in Everyday Life” (in English), which my colleagues and I produced within the European Nuclear Physics Collaboration NuPECC.