Key political players' positions on energy policy in Czechia

In their election programmes, the parties and coalitions contesting the election offer very little detail on their vision for the future development of the energy sector. I believe this is currently a key issue that will critically affect the economic and social development of Czechia and the European Union. For me at least, it is also an important factor in choosing whom to vote for. I therefore listened with interest to the discussion of this topic by representatives sent by ANO, Spolu and PirSTAN on the weekend edition of Questions of Václav Moravec.
I recommend listening to the discussion to every potential voter. Helena Langšádlová of TOP09 was selected to represent the Spolu coalition; Lukáš Wagenknecht of the Pirates represented the Pirates and STAN coalition; and Karel Havlíček represented ANO. In a recent article, I described in detail why I believe managing the current energy transition is so important. For Czechia, which still has a very high share of coal-fired generation and whose economic and social standing is heavily dependent on industry, the currently required transition to a low-emission mix is an extremely demanding challenge involving major risks. In the article referenced, I noted that Czechia has only limited opportunities to use renewable sources and that its low-emission mix cannot do without a strong role for nuclear energy.
The energy solution offered, and above all implemented, by the winning grouping that forms the future government will be crucial to our society's future standard of living and social stability. This is also why it is very bad that the key political players have extremely vague and general election programmes on energy. They make clear that even within the respective coalitions, such as Spolu or PirSTAN, the question of their stance on nuclear energy and the energy sector as a whole has not been resolved. At the same time, they want to appeal to both anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear voters. They therefore do not seek to develop, let alone present and declare in their election programmes, a specific energy policy.
New reactor at Dukovany
I therefore watched with interest whether the representatives sent by the Spolu and PirSTAN coalitions in particular would be more specific in the discussion of this topic on Questions of Václav Moravec. And I must admit that I was considerably disgusted by their performance. In energy matters, the discussion focused on nuclear power and construction of a new nuclear unit at Dukovany. The Spolu coalition sent MP Helena Langšádlová to analyse the issue, although her remarks showed that she has minimal knowledge of its actual technical, economic and other aspects. Her only qualification was that she was ideologically anti-Russian in the right way, and her zeal in this area. Indeed, forcefulness in anti-Russian statements was the only thing she presented.
This became apparent right at the start, when she made absolutely no distinction between someone not wanting to exclude one of the potential bidders a priori and someone wanting that bidder to win the tender. And even now, although this has already been discussed many times, she again cited setting the upper limit for the unit's capacity at 1200 MWe as evidence that the tender was tailored for Rosatom. So Karel Havlíček again had to explain that this was not arbitrary. Nor was it intended to favour a particular supplier. Not least because the US company Westinghouse also has an operating unit with the required output.
Electrical output corresponds to a certain required thermal output and to the associated cooling capacity required at a given site. At the Dukovany site, the available cooling capacity is for roughly 3200 MWe. If we want to operate the existing units, with a capacity of 2000 MWe, until 2045 and operate a new unit alongside them from 2036, the aforementioned limit is needed. I would personally add that, given the size of our energy system, a smaller unit is more suitable in terms of balancing and backup as well. Especially as it is later to replace two units, each with an output of 500 MWe.
Senator Lukáš Wagenknecht, meanwhile, kept repeating that the reactor would cost CZK 400 billion and would be a nuclear boondoggle. He conflated the price of electricity, the cost of the unit with and without financing costs, and other concepts. Throughout, he was clearly trying to discourage construction of a large Generation III unit. He pointed out that small modular reactors could be used and that their development in Czechia needed support. He suggested that, instead of building a large unit at Dukovany, the government should address energy policy by developing our own small modular reactors.
Small modular reactors
I myself support the development of modular reactors and follow the issue very closely. At the start of this year, I published an overview of the current state of this field. This overview alone makes clear that commercial designs that we could invite to any potential tender will not be available until the end of the decade at the earliest. In my view, small modular reactors are more suitable for bringing nuclear energy into decentralised electricity and heat generation than for replacing large units. In any case, their practical deployment is still quite far off.
I was even more surprised that Lukáš Wagenknecht tried to suggest that we should not address our energy needs with today's large reactors, nor with future foreign small modular reactors. In his view, we should meet our nuclear capacity needs by paying for the development of our own small modular reactor. I know of four small modular reactor projects being worked on in Czechia. I would very much like to see at least one ultimately realised. And I will certainly welcome these projects receiving appropriate financial support, whether from private or state sources. It should also be stressed that work on such projects, even if they are not ultimately mass-produced, is beneficial in any case. It also supports the field itself, its technological capabilities, the education of specialists and growth in the required capacity. However, Mr Wagenknecht's promotion of their development as a substitute for construction of a new large unit at Dukovany seems to me rather like a thinly disguised means of completely preventing construction of new nuclear capacity in Czechia.
I do not know which of the Czech projects mentioned Lukáš Wagenknecht had in mind. The first is a system being developed by Witkowitz. It would be a small modular reactor designed to make maximum use of existing components and technologies, reducing development and licensing requirements. It would be a light-water reactor with a core made up of fuel assemblies used in current VVER reactors. Their number would be limited so that the entire core could fit into a container similar to those used for storing such spent fuel assemblies. The core would thus be replaced and transported to and from the power plant as a whole, while the fuel assemblies within it would be replaced at a central facility. The unit would have space for two cores. After several years of operation, the core would be moved to the lower section, where it would cool down. A new core would be inserted and lowered above it. Once this subsequent core had completed its service, the older one would be removed, freeing up space for it. I rather think that Mr Wagenknecht did not have this project in mind, because it is too closely associated with Russian technologies.
Another Czech project is the Teplátor, associated with the Czech Technical University in Prague. It is a heavy-water reactor, again envisaging the use of fuel assemblies for VVER reactors. In this case, the use of both fresh and spent fuel assemblies is anticipated. The use of spent assemblies is made possible precisely by using heavy water as a moderator. Deuterium absorbs fewer neutrons and improves the system's neutron economy. Although using spent fuel assemblies can improve the economics of this reactor, it also increases licensing complexity. It should be recalled that this is not a reactor for electricity generation, but purely for heat production. It could therefore be an ideal replacement for coal-fired heating plants, but it cannot replace nuclear or coal-fired power plants.
The research organisation CVŘ s.r.o., part of the ÚJV a.s. group, is working on two further projects. These are highly innovative designs that cannot realistically be expected very soon. The first is the molten-salt-cooled, high-temperature Energy Well reactor. Besides generating electricity, it could also produce hydrogen or high temperatures for industry very efficiently. The second is the helium-cooled, Generation IV fast reactor HeFASTo, which would be predominantly focused on producing heat and hydrogen for industrial operations. It could operate in breeder-reactor mode.
If Mr Wagenknecht meant intensive financial support for reactors being developed by a subsidiary of ÚJV a.s., then I did not understand his other campaign, which he also presented on Václav Moravec's programme: his attempt to exclude Czech companies that, in his view, have an unsuitable ownership structure from any participation in Czech nuclear power. His targets are ÚJV a.s. and Škoda JS a.s. It should be recalled that Škoda JS a.s. is owned by the Russian engineering group OMZ, which is controlled by Gazprombank. And Škoda JS owns around 16 % of the shares in ÚJV a.s. Mr Wagenknecht thus wants to exclude Škoda JS a.s. and ÚJV a.s. from all involvement in supplies to the Czech energy sector. Watching his campaign, I am beginning to feel that some of our politicians, instead of seeking the greatest possible participation of Czech companies in building new Czech capacity, are fighting for the smallest possible participation.
Conclusion
Instead of presenting the individual groups' energy policies and seeking a common approach to addressing the various problems facing us, the entire discussion ultimately degenerated into political fighting and politicking. It seemed to me that, just as in times I do not like to remember, politicians without knowledge or respect for the facts, but with the right ideological zeal and a talent for politicking, are once again increasingly beginning to decide matters.
A security assessment is currently under way, from which Chinese and Russian companies have already been excluded. Only suppliers that pass the security assessment can be invited to the tender. As Karel Havlíček noted, if Rosatom were to re-enter the process, the current tender, which has not yet been announced, would have to be cancelled and everything started completely from scratch.
In my view, and not only mine, this would most likely mean a complete collapse of potential suppliers' trust in our politicians. We have already once cancelled a tender into which participants had invested considerable effort and money. I would remind readers that governments including both ODS and TOP09 took part in preparing and running the Temelín tender, in which Rosatom and Westinghouse were the finalists. Cancelling a second one, even at a stage when it had not yet been fully announced, would represent a fall that would be difficult to overcome.
As I wrote back in March, I personally consider broad competition without excluding Russian and Chinese suppliers to be preferable. However, if a broad political consensus has emerged to bar them from the tender, I accept that. I believe that with such a small number of suppliers and such heavy weight assigned to geopolitical and ideological aspects, selecting the supplier without a tender is more appropriate. That is what the Poles do, for example. For the reasons mentioned, however, I am convinced that the only route to a rapid start of construction and its timely completion is to continue with the current process and launch the tender. Halting the process and restarting from scratch is an enormous gamble.
The current conduct of politicians from all parties unfortunately fills me with enormous scepticism. It seems to me that whichever grouping with a realistic chance of winning prevails, we will once again witness permanent political fighting and politicking. And the chance of strategic steps towards an effective transformation of our energy sector is minimal. This is tragic, because we will need to face pressure from our neighbours and negotiate many matters within European Union bodies. Unfortunately, our politicians are most likely incapable of the effective cooperation and at least basic consensus at national level that this requires. Naturally, this is my subjective opinion, so once again I recommend that everyone listen to Sunday's Questions of Václav Moravec and form their own view.
Translation disclaimer
This article is a machine translation of the Czech original and has not yet been fully reviewed. In case of any doubt, please refer to the Czech version.




